The Alter-EU Movement and European Governance by Balme, Richard & Chabanet, Didier
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE ALTER-EU MOVEMENT AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE 
Richard Balme - Didier Chabanet1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The recent obstacles to European integration have relaunched a debate that makes 
ethics and transparency core parts of the European agenda. This hints at the possibility 
of a more demanding regulation of lobbyists and, in broader terms, of all parties involved 
in the European Governance. The dynamics currently at work testify to growing 
receptiveness of EU officials to the claims of the Alter-EU movement; to the power 
struggles between representation models; and to the existence of more or less open, 
virtuous and/or citizen-controlled conceptions of public action that reflect differentiated 
national traditions and practices. 
 
                                                
1 Richard Balme est professeur des universités à l’Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris et à l’Université de 
Pékin. Didier Chabanet est  politologue, chercheur associé à Triangle (Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon - 
Langues et Sciences Humaines). Ce texte est un extrait de Richard Balme et Didier Chabanet, Collective 
Action and European Democracy, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. 
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In Europe the alterglobalist movement was born and developed outside EU institutions. 
Its capacity for challenge via the media and popular mobilisation is in marked contrast 
with the scepticism and even outright rejection of these institutions by a growing section 
of the population, and highlights the trend to significant dualisation of the European 
public arena. The maturation of this protest movement, now capable of exercising real 
influence, and the increasing receptiveness of European spheres to their criticism are 
giving rise to a profoundly new configuration and the possibility of an integrated political 
debate. What is interesting here is that the transparency of European institutions and the 
regulation of lobbying are simultaneously the cause of the emergence of a new alter-EU 
movement, which has contributed significantly to the construction of the European 
Commission's agenda.  
 
The Alter-EU movement – the Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Regulation 
– has gradually been taking shape since late 2004, its main weapon being denunciation 
of collusion between business and European decision-making circles. Now presenting 
as a credible interlocutor, it brings together the traditional alterglobalist actors – ATTAC 
for example – with Eurogroups generally representing civic or social interests that see 
themselves as maltreated by the current EU style of governance, and journalists' 
associations, notably the European Federation of Journalists, concerned about the 
influence of pressure groups on the media. Determination to counter the atmosphere of 
Euroscepticism represents a window of opportunity for the Alter-EU movement, whose 
leaders regularly meet with high-ranking Commission staff. Its influence depends less on 
its financial and logistical resources, or even the size of its membership, than on overall 
alter-European protest power and, consequently, the more or less conciliatory attitude 
taken towards it by the European institutions. Despite this favourable context, however, 
its political existence lacks stability and remains relatively fragile. 
 
Largely designed as an information network, Alter-EU makes enormous use of the 
Internet to put an extremely precise and well-documented case grounded in research 
and often couched in humorous or satirical terms. Its way of working is systematised 
enough to suggest a strategic positioning especially well adapted to its chosen vector 
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and likely to catch the eye of netsurfers and a broad audience.1 Its aim is to solicit the 
attention of a public with no specialist knowledge of European issues, while setting itself 
apart from the jargon and hermetic style usually employed by EU institutions. Just as 
social movements with little political or institutional backing specialise in spectacular 
activities, Alter-EU has opted for a distinctly original style of action and argument, with 
humour and ridicule as its favourite weapons. Basically it advocates a binding system of 
regulation applicable to all special interest categories; exceptions would be made, 
however, for unstructured groups with limited resources – no office in Brussels, for 
example – for which the demand for a declaration of activity and/or transparency 
obligations would involve administrative costs too heavy to bear. 
 
Since late 2004 Alter-EU has set up a precise programme which is closely drawn on by 
the Commission for its thinking on lobbying regulation and the transparency of European 
institutions. The most striking proposals bear on establishment of an independent public 
body with the powers needed to act as a public guardian of lobbying transparency and 
ethics; for lobbyists, a mandatory system of electronic registration and reporting to 
ensure transparency in EU decision-making (including the names of their clients); Rules 
of Conduct for Lobbyists and EU Officials, notably including a revolving door system 
imposing a period of transition before any move from the private sector to posts of 
responsibility within the Commission and vice versa; and an obligatory Declaration of 
Personal Financial Interest. Furthermore, immediate family members of a covered 
official should be prohibited from lobbying for compensation the agency on which the 
covered official serves; lobbyists and their clients should be prohibited from offering gifts 
with a value of more than 150 euros – they must declare all reimbursement to an official; 
for each policy proposal the European Commission should publish a list of organizations 
it has consulted on this proposal.2 This impressive list of measures also deserves 
attention in that it represents the background to the European Transparency Initiative, 
                                                
1 For instance Lobby Planet: Brussels – the EU Quarter follows the Lonely Planet guidebook model, 
providing a very comprehensive set of indications on the geography of the main interest groups in Brussels 
and using their cartography to stress their nearness to European institutions. There is also an annual "Worst 
EU Lobby Award" for a group using tactics regarded as especially unacceptable. 
2 Alter-EU, Recommendations on Lobbying Transparency and Ethics in the European Union, January 13, 
2006, 5 p. 
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officially launched in March 2005 by the Vice-President of the European Commission 
and Commissioner for Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud.  
 
Initially scheduled for late 2005, the Green Paper European Transparency Initiative did 
not appear until 3 May 2006, the delay resulting from the extreme difficulty of defining a 
framework for the resultant public consultation.1 Even so, this new stage marks a 
significant advance: firstly because the issue under consideration has never been set so 
directly at the core of the European political agenda; and secondly because the 
Commission itself acknowledges having "launched a review of its overall approach to 
transparency", with an explicit emphasis on "the need for a more structured framework 
for the activities of interest representatives."2  
 
Partisans of strict regulation will doubtless be disappointed to find that in the final 
document compulsory registration for interest groups has once again been postponed – 
even though it had been seriously suggested by top Commission officials – and they 
may see this as a retrograde step: "A tighter system of self-regulation would appear 
more appropriate. However, after a certain period, a review should be conducted to 
examine whether self-regulation has worked. If not, consideration could be given to a 
system of compulsory measures – a compulsory code of conduct plus compulsory 
registration."3 Those of a pessimistic – or realistic – bent might point out that this was 
exactly the Commission's line in 1992. And they will not be well pleased to see the issue 
of the recycling of senior European functionaries in the business world totally ignored. 
 
Even so, the Commission's proposals are not entirely without weight. With its plan for a 
web-based voluntary system with incentives to register for all lobbyists who wish to be 
consulted on EU initiatives, the Commission is aiming at making public the activities of 
all interest groups – think tanks, companies specialising in European affairs, legal 
consultancies, employer organisations, etc. – that do not appear in the CONNECS 
databank and currently operate for the most part in secret. The effectiveness of the rules 
of transparency is also slated for improvement, with plans for an independent authority in 
                                                
1 Green Paper, European Transparency Initiative, 17 p. 
2 Ibid., p. 3. 
3 Ibid., p. 10.  
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charge of monitoring the system and imposing sanctions in cases of misleading 
registration and/or violation of a code of professional ethics ultimately applicable to all 
lobbyists. Such a system would provide the general public with a fairly comprehensive 
information tool, one enabling a better understanding of the rationale of representation of 
European interests and at least partial clarification of the EU decision-making process. 
 
Where the regulation of interest groups is concerned, the Parliament and the 
Commission have historically adopted largely contradictory, competing lines of conduct, 
the former laboriously putting together a compulsory system of registration and the latter 
– in favour of self-regulation – settling for incentive measures. More than just the status 
of pressure groups, what is ultimately at stake here is the model of political 
representation and the conception of European society currently under construction. The 
influence of the English-speaking – and even more so the Scandinavian – countries 
appears to be a growing factor in the orienting of the EU's political agenda and 
standards, and this suggests the possibility of a more rigorous system for the not too 
distant future, one that would enhance the legibility of the European decision-making 
system and the role of its various stakeholders. At the same time the rapprochement 
between some of the demands of the alter-European movement – notably in the fields of 
ethics and transparency – and the political policies laid down by EU institutions is 
opening up a critical period for the future: a period that will provide vital indications of 
Europe's capacity to meet the aspirations of those calling for a more virtuous democracy. 
 
